

Geneva to negotiate INF. Nitze's deputy, Mike Glitman, seemed a natural for the job. I also heard rumors that Senator Tower was looking for a job in Geneva but thought he might become the D&S negotiator.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I was summoned to Secretary Schultz's office and told the President had decided to put in a new team of negotiators. I told him I was shocked that we had fallen for the Soviet ploy of putting in new negotiators. I was certain they would not do so.

Schultz said it was beside the point. The President would name Kampelman the overall negotiator who would also negotiate D&S. Senator Tower would take my place as START negotiator and Glitman would take Nitze's place in INF.

“Well,” I said, “I think the President is making a mistake but he's the boss. ”

Special Advisor to the President, Arms Control Matters

Schultz said the President wanted **Nitze** and me to stay on and become special advisors to him on arms control. "He wants to take more interest in arms control and thought he would like to have you stay in Washington, close at hand, to advise him." I told Schultz I was a big boy and he didn't have to sugar-coat the pill. If they didn't want me, I was ready to leave. "no, no," Schultz insisted, "the President wants you." I said I would like to hear it from the President himself. Schultz called up the President and got me an immediate appointment to see him.

On the way to the White House, Schultz said he hoped I wouldn't turn the President down when he made his request for me to stay on. I said, "Well, I want to hear it from him."

Schultz did not go into the Oval Office with me when I met with the President. The President asked me what I thought about the new team. I said it was his call, but I always considered continuity to be important and was certain the Soviets wouldn't change their team. He said that his idea was not to change the team but to have me in Washington where I could concentrate on advising him. I said, "Mr. President, you don't have to let me down easy. It was an honor to have served you, and I think I should leave and do something else."

“No,” he insisted, “I want you to stay. ”

I said I didn't know how it would work. "I won't have a portfolio; I won't have a real job."

“Yes, you will,- he said. “You’ll have a staff and will advise me on a regular basis. You’ll have access to me and will sit in on Cabinet meetings that deal with arms control.” I said I had difficulty seeing how my job would sit with other agencies, the established bureaucracy. “It will sit well with them because it is what I want,” he said.

I said I would need to be assured that I would have access to the National Security Council and attend their meetings. He pushed a buzzer and soon Jim Baker, his chief of staff, walked in. “Jim,” he said, “I’ve offered Rowny the job of being a special advisor to me on arms control matters. I would also like him to advise the Secretary of State. Rowny wants assurances that he is going to get into the act and be a player?”

Baker said, “Okay, we’ll give Rowny support and guarantee him access.”

I said that under the circumstances I’d take the job and see how it worked out. In February 1985 I was officially designated special advisor to the President and Secretary of State for arms control matters.

After I went to the first several meetings of the National Security Council, I could see that the White House was true to its word. I was able to present my advice and had a fairly high success rate at having it followed. Paul Nitze, who had been given the same title, moved into an office close to the Secretary of State on the seventh floor. Nitze became Schultz’s right hand man on arms control as far as the State Department was concerned. I stayed in my original office on the fourth floor of the State Department. While I went to the more important meetings Schultz called on arms control, I did not interact with Schultz on a day-to-day basis.

There was a minus and a plus side to my working arrangement with the secretary. Nitze was an integral part of Schultz’s staff; I was not. When Nitze made a recommendation and it was turned down, Nitze accepted the decision and closed ranks with the State Department. When one of my recommendations was turned down, I would reevaluate the issue. If on further analysis I thought the State position was correct, I would support it. If my analysis convinced me they were wrong, I would write up my views and forward them to the President through the National Security Advisor. I would always send a copy to the Secretary of State. On some issues the President decided in State’s favor, on others he sided with me. In those instances where my views differed from State’s, the decisions were about 50-50 in my favor.

I was able, therefore, to play an independent role, one which suited me better than Nitze’s role. As time went on I felt I had a stronger hand at influencing decisions at the top than I had enjoyed as the START negotiator. While I missed the

excitement and day-to-day involvement in Geneva, it was a satisfying job. Even though Nitze worked more closely with the State Department, I preferred my situation over Nitze's.

A different relationship developed between Schultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, the new Soviet foreign minister who had replaced Gromyko. Whereas President Reagan had formerly put down a number of good positions, they didn't get very far with the old Brezhnev-Gromyko team. But the foundation had been laid and the U.S. had generated sufficient strength to give us leverage at the negotiating table. Now there was a new set of players at the top. However, the negotiating team in Geneva was just as obstinate and wedded to its old positions as it always had been. It took decisions at the Schultz-Shevardnadze level to override the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. Even so, the Soviet negotiators remained true to type. Even when they had been overruled and some compromise had been struck at the foreign minister level, they would try to walk the decisions back, or at least get us to pay a price for Soviet movement.

Nevertheless, the new Soviet leadership paved the way for four summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev. The first took place in Geneva—it was a get-to-know-you meeting, which included the famous fireside chat. The second was not to have been a summit meeting at all but simply a weekend get-together session at Reykjavik. However, it turned out to be a very important meeting. The third summit meeting took place in Washington in December 1987. At this summit meeting there was some progress made on START, but the main accomplishment was an agreement on the terms of the INF treaty. The fourth summit took place in Moscow in late May 1988. At this meeting the instruments of ratification of the INF treaty were exchanged.

As I mentioned earlier, the first summit was a get-to-know-you meeting. Gorbachev, although less dogmatic than Brezhnev, lectured Reagan on the evils of capitalism. He admitted some hints that the socialist economy was not working, yet revealed his ideological indoctrination. He seemed thoroughly convinced that Soviet-style socialism, with some changes, would make the grade. He talked about greed and dishonesty which he felt were inherent in Western capitalism. Reagan reminded him, gently yet firmly, that greed and corruption were more rampant, and less controllable, in the Soviet Union. Raisa Gorbachev, perhaps even a stronger ideologue than her husband, gave Nancy Reagan similar lectures.

At a postmortem after the summit, Secretary Schultz told Reagan he was going to Brussels to debrief the NATO allies on what had transpired. He mentioned that Gorbachev was going to Prague to debrief the Warsaw Pact ministers. Reagan asked if anyone thought the Warsaw Pact ministers would be interested in our

version of what occurred. None of his principal advisors thought so. But Reagan noticed I had nodded affirmatively.

"Ed seems to think they would be interested," he said. "Why don't we call Prague and find out?"

I called our ambassador in Prague, Jay Niemczyk, an old friend. He said he thought it was a good idea and would check with the Jakes government. In an hour he called back with a favorable reply. I then called Warsaw, and in similar fashion received an invitation to debrief them. My response from Budapest was the same.

Armed with these three invitations, I called our ambassador in East Berlin, Rozalind Ridgeway. She personally thought it was a good idea but said she would have to check. She called back to say that the East German officials were originally cool to the idea, but since Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Hungarian officials were being briefed the East Germans did not want to be odd-man-out.

I was well received at the four capitals behind what was then the Iron Curtain. The Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians told me that the facts I presented were identical to those Gorbachev had given them, although the interpretations and policy implications were far apart. Only in East Germany did the officials contest me and argue with our interpretations.

This started a pattern which I repeated three more times during Reagan's second term. I also traveled to Rome, where I debriefed the Pope. These discussions in Rome were as fascinating as they were personally satisfying.

Following my trips to Europe, President Reagan sent me on similar missions to Asia. I had consultations with our allies: Japan, Korea and Australia, and discussions with our friends: China. The distinction between consultations and discussions was an important one—we only consulted with allies. This pattern continued into the first year of the Bush administration. I made four trips to Europe and nine trips to the Far East during Reagan's time and two trips to each area during Bush's time. In addition, I made two trips to Latin American capitals for discussions there during the first year of the Bush administration.

The consultations proved to be especially worthwhile in Asia, and particularly useful in connection with the INF treaty.

Following the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting, there were several meetings between the nine arms control experts on each side, of which I was one. There was a hint at the second of these experts' meetings that the Soviets would reduce their INF forces in Asia from 572 to 100. They had previously said they



Ambassador Edward Rowny with Pope John Paul II, June 1985.

would reduce to zero their intermediate forces to zero in Europe but that they would not reduce them at all in Asia. I advised President Reagan that the Soviets be required to reduce in Asia as well as in Europe, and he backed up my recommendation.

When I returned from Japan I debriefed Secretary Schultz and President Reagan on the hard line the Japanese had taken. I learned that the Japanese prime minister had already cabled the President saying that the INF treaty should provide for zero intermediate force warheads globally. To my pleasant surprise the President agreed and said, "Then that's what we'll do." Secretary Schultz argued that a global zero position would jeopardize our getting agreement to an INF treaty and that the negotiations were, in fact, going quite well. But President Reagan issued instructions to inform the Japanese that the U.S. position would call for global zero.



Edward L. Rowny with Vice President George Bush, 28 September 1983.

It was interesting that the Japanese and the Chinese both put pressure on the Soviets through diplomatic channels to accept the global zero position.

This was done very cleverly. They did not, of course, stress that they had their interests at heart and did not want to be targeted by Soviet SS-20s. Instead, they pointed to the difficulties we in the U.S. would have during the ratification process with verification, since zero was easier to verify than some finite number. Furthermore, they pointed out, these missiles were mobile and could be moved so as to target Europe. Therefore the U.S. could not claim there would be no warheads targeted against Europe.

I experienced some of this diplomatic pressure applied against the Soviets. In June 1987 I attended an East-West meeting under the auspices of the United Nations at Dagomys on the Black Sea. The Soviets had high-level representatives at this conference. Bessmertnykh, who became the Soviet ambassador to the United States and was then a deputy foreign minister, attended, as well as General Chervov. Chervov, a colonel general, was in the Soviet Defense Ministry and was reportedly

a close friend and advisor to Marshal Akhromeyev, the head of the Soviet armed forces.

The Chinese representative at the Dagomys conference made quite a strong case for a global zero solution to INF. Bessmertnykh and Chervov talked to me about it and asked how strongly the U.S. felt about global zero. I told them the U.S. felt quite strongly and told them that the Japanese were adamant. They said they knew about the Japanese view because they had heard from them directly. While Bessmertnykh and Chervov made no commitments, I could see that wheels were turning. I became more convinced than ever that the Soviets wanted an agreement on INF and wanted it badly.

I also had an opportunity at Dagomys to work out with Chervov and Bessmertnykh some ideas I had about how we might treat air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in START. Chervov was quite receptive to my idea that we count all air-launched cruise missiles on a bomber as one warhead and a bomber as one missile system. We also discussed that we might simply declare how many sea-launched cruise missiles we had rather than include them in the count.

On my way home I stopped off in Moscow and talked to Karpov. He was surprised at what I told him about my discussions with Bessmertnykh and Chervov, but listened very carefully. As it turned out later in Reykjavik, these proposals were the very ones that were put forth by Akhromeyev and eventually included in START.

Q: Could you discuss some of the details of the meeting at Reykjavik?

A: Reykjavik was not planned to be a summit meeting. It came about largely because of Soviet pressure for a meeting between the get-toknow-you session in Geneva and the next summit meeting which was scheduled for the fall. But the Soviets kept making overtures about the desirability of a meeting and it became difficult for Reagan to say that he was too busy with domestic issues. As a result, Reagan decided that he and Gorbachev would meet briefly over a weekend at some place halfway between Washington and Moscow. The halfway point was chosen as Reykjavik in Iceland.

Q: Can you tell me something about the preliminaries to Reykjavik?

A: Early in 1986, Gorbachev seized the initiative in arms control. He called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The proposal was obviously designed for its propaganda effect, made obvious by the fact that Gorbachev made

his proposal public. Clearly, the Soviets were making an offer only for its effect on world opinion. Gorbachev also proposed that only U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe be reduced and not also British or French missiles. This, if it came to pass, would be a monumental breakthrough.

The dilemma facing Reagan was how to deal with Gorbachev's proposal. Should it be dismissed simply as a propaganda ploy? Or would it be better to counter it with a concrete, detailed U.S. proposal? The President chose the second approach. As a result, we developed with great care a reply designed to smoke out whether the Soviets were indeed serious about eliminating all nuclear weapons. We also welcomed the prospect of eliminating intermediate-range missiles.

Q: What happened at Reykjavik?

A: In Reykjavik, true to form, Gorbachev tried to brush aside subjects related to the East-West relationship and to deal only with arms control. Once again, Reagan insisted that his broad agenda, including regional issues and human rights, be discussed. Despite repeated attempts by Reagan to engage Gorbachev on the broad agenda, Reagan did not succeed.

When the two leaders got around to arms control, Gorbachev repeated the proposal he had made in January that all strategic nuclear weapons be eliminated. He also said that the Soviets were prepared to talk in detail about START and INF. Reagan suggested that arms control experts get together that evening.

When we sat down in Hofdi House at 8 p.m. Saturday night, October 10, 1986, there were several surprises. The first was the composition of the Soviet team. Whereas our team consisted of the same members who had attended the previous experts' sessions, the Soviets showed up with almost an entirely new team. The one exception was Karpov. This time their team was headed by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff of the Soviet armed forces. Two others were well-known Soviet officials heavily involved in Soviet public relations and propaganda: Georgi Arbatov and Feydor N. Fallin. Their top expert on space systems, Feydor Velikov, was at the table, as was their ambassador to the U.S., Yuli Dubinin. It was obvious from the outset that the Soviets would use the Reykjavik meetings as grist for their public relations and propaganda mills.

When I saw Marshal Akhromeyev at the table, I knew at once that the Soviets had come to Reykjavik prepared to deal. I had been involved in a similar situation once before, in Moscow in March 1977. When the Soviets were ready to move ahead in the SALT negotiations, they brought in Marshal Nikolai Ogarkhov. It

seems that whenever the Soviets were ready to strike a deal, they appointed a top military man to head their team.

Marshal Akhromeyev, a spare, bespectacled man in his 60s, was obviously in charge. When Karpov tried to intervene, Akhromeyev simply ignored him. The marshal proposed that we begin with START, proceed to INF, and then to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Akhromeyev further suggested that we build on the progress made by the experts and reduce strategic weapons to 6,000 "charges," a reduction of 50 percent. We said we could agree, but only if the aggregate number of weapons did not include individual bomber weapons. To my pleasant surprise, Akhromeyev suggested a solution along the lines Chervov, Bessmertnykh, and I had discussed in September: that is, to count bombers carrying only bombs as a single weapon in the 6,000 aggregate. This was entirely satisfactory to us. Next, Akhromeyev turned to SLCMs [sea-launched cruise missiles], and again, as Chervov, Bessmertnykh, and I had discussed, proposed that we establish separate limits for these weapons outside the aggregate. This triggered a prolonged and inconclusive discussion lasting several hours on how a SLCM limit could be verified.

During the all-night marathon session, I spoke several times to Akhromeyev. He was the only person on the Soviet side who spoke no English, and I was the only person on our side who spoke some Russian. Our one-on-one informal sessions revealed Akhromeyev's sense of humor. When I asked him if he was one of the few remaining military men on active duty who had seen combat in World War II, he said, "What do you mean by world War II? Do you mean the Great Patriotic War?"

"Okay, have it your way," I said.

He replied: "Da, ya posledneye iz Mahikan" [Yes, I'm the last of the Mahicans]. When I asked him where he had picked up that expression, he said with a wry smile, "It's an old Russian saying."

Some six hours after we had started, about 2 a.m., Akhromeyev offered us conditions we could accept on strategic forces and shifted to intermediate-range forces. We said we were willing to reduce globally to 200 warheads on each side, of which 100 would be in Europe. Akhromeyev said he would go us one better and proposed that we reduce to zero in Europe. We said we wanted the Soviets to reduce their forces "proportionately and concurrently" in Asia and therefore reduce them to zero as well.

"No," Akhromeyev said, "no reductions in Asia." When we pressed him to reduce in Asia, Akhromeyev replied with a typically western expression: "That

decision can only be made by someone above my pay grade.” It was clear he had no authority on this issue-it was up to Gorbachev to make that decision.

By the time the session broke up at 6 a.m., we had agreed on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms in five years-a major step forward. On INF, we agreed to reduce to zero in Europe but the Soviets would not budge on reducing any missiles in Asia. The Soviets had not brought up the thorniest issue, the reduction of all nuclear weapons.

On Sunday morning, during what was to have been the final session, Reagan and Gorbachev quickly agreed to reduce strategic forces by 50 percent. In a long session on INF, Gorbachev repeated his acceptance of zero in Europe but would not budge on reducing SS-20s in Asia. Reagan would not agree. Much to my disappointment, since I thought Reagan would get on a slippery slope, the President proposed that the sides eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles in a 10-year period. Gorbachev countered by repeating his earlier proposal that all nuclear weapons be eliminated by the year 2000.

I became nervous, hoping that Reagan would not get trapped. However, Reagan carefully began to extricate himself. He said that he too wished to see the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. However, he wanted an “insurance policy” which held on to air- and sea-launched cruise missiles until the conventional imbalance was redressed. Reagan said he wanted to assure there was "coupling of nuclear and conventional forces. He said that he did not want "to make the world safe for conventional warfare." It was a clever rejoinder, but I was still nervous. Could Reagan pull it off with Gorbachev? And if so, could he explain it to the American people?

This exchange was at the core of the controversy which the Soviets have kept alive since Reykjavik. Gorbachev subsequently repeated the assertion that Reagan assented to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This, unfortunately, was true. But Gorbachev added that Reagan agreed to eliminate all weapons by 1996 which Reagan did not do. Reagan had proposed to eliminate all weapons eventually and only the ballistic missiles by **1996**. Reagan made it clear that his proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons was an eventual goal. But Gorbachev attempted to use the ambiguity to embarrass Reagan.

At this stage of the discussion, time was running out. The Reykjavik meeting was scheduled to end at **12:30** p.m., and it was already noon. Gorbachev showed himself to be a skillful debater and a clever tactician. He had Reagan over a barrel by proposing to eliminate all nuclear weapons and knew it. Reagan did not want to admit to Gorbachev, or to the world, that he opposed eliminating all nuclear weapons. In fact he had telegraphed to us that he would have liked to do so, but

respected our opinion and took our advice. He said that it was impractical to reduce all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, that it must be an eventual goal. Reagan, to our surprise, proved he could hold his own in a debate with Gorbachev. He amazed us with his dexterity and his firmness. Reagan might just pull it off.

The discussion shifted to the unresolved issue of what to do about the ABM treaty. Reagan tried to get Gorbachev to be precise on what he meant by “strengthening the ABM treaty.” Gorbachev said he meant that research on strategic defenses should be confined to ground laboratories. Since the ABM treaty has nothing in it concerning research, it confirmed our belief that Gorbachev wanted to make the ABM treaty more restrictive than the treaty specified. Reagan, annoyed by Gorbachev’s stand on the ABM treaty, saw a way of diverting the argument away from the main issue of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Reagan proposed that there be an additional session that afternoon. It was now 1:30 p.m., one hour after the meeting was to have concluded. They agreed to meet again at 3 p.m.

During lunch, President Reagan reviewed the situation with us, saying that two main issues needed clearing up. First, had he made it clear to the Soviets that we were willing to reduce ballistic missiles, but not all nuclear weapons, by 2000? We said that he had made it clear to Gorbachev, but did not trust him. It was too great an opportunity for Gorbachev not to exploit. He could appeal to world opinion that Reagan had turned down his offer to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Reagan’s counter offer of eliminating only ballistic missiles might be lost on the public. We discussed the second issue, whether or not the Soviets were serious about insisting that our SDI research program be restricted to ground laboratories? We convinced the President that Gorbachev was not seeking a reasonable solution but simply trying to kill the U.S. SDI program.

When the two leaders resumed that afternoon, they held to their respective positions. Gorbachev proposed that all nuclear weapons be reduced by the year 2000 and Reagan again made it clear that we proposed that only ballistic missiles be reduced by 1996. Reagan reiterated that we must hold out some nuclear weapons until the conventional imbalance had been redressed. Reagan went to great lengths to make his position clear. But Gorbachev would not acknowledge that he understood. The possibility remained that Gorbachev would try to embarrass Reagan publicly.

On the issue of “strengthening the ABM treaty,” Gorbachev repeated that he wanted to restrict strategic defense research to ground laboratories. Reagan called a recess and once again reviewed the situation with us. The President asked us what questions he should put to Gorbachev to smoke out whether he was seeking a reasonable solution or simply trying to kill our SDI program. Reagan asked each of us in turn whether he could safeguard U.S. interests by accepting Gorbachev’s

proposal. He did not get a unanimous opinion; most of his advisors said that he could live with Gorbachev's proposal. But several of us told the President he was doing the right thing by not accepting limits on our SDI program. He accepted our recommendation. By late afternoon, it became obvious to Reagan that Gorbachev was intent on killing our SDI program. Accordingly, Reagan proposed that they adjourn and announce that substantial progress had been made in the START and INF areas, but none on the ABM treaty.

Immediately after the meeting, Secretary Schultz held a press conference. Tired and frustrated that no agreement had been reached on the ABM treaty and SDI issue, and worried that Gorbachev might exploit the "elimination of all nuclear weapons" issue, Schultz painted a dark picture. Only belatedly did he say that substantial progress had been made on INF and START. The press honed in on the negative aspects of the meeting and neglected its positive aspects.

Gorbachev, in his press conference, tried to exploit the "elimination of all weapons" issue. But whereas he had been skillful in debating Reagan, he was less clear in answering press queries. He appeared tired and confused. As a result he failed to capitalize on the propaganda advantage we thought was his. The Western press, used to short, crisp answers, got lost when Gorbachev went into long-winded explanations. We felt that Gorbachev had saved us, but were still not quite certain. We advised the President to report to the American people on nationwide TV the following evening.

Following the President's address, during which Reagan did a masterful job of emphasizing the positive aspects of Reykjavik, the press stories in the United States turned around. By the end of the week, a nationwide poll indicated that 70 percent of the American people approved of the way President Reagan had handled himself at Reykjavik.

Q: What did you do after the Reykjavik meeting?

A: I left at once for Tokyo and then on to Seoul and Beijing to report on what had happened. The original foreign press accounts of Reykjavik repeated the negative stories filed the night before. However, the Japanese government took the unprecedented step of running President Reagan's TV address live throughout all of Japan. The great communicator had succeeded again. A Japanese poll expressed a vote of confidence in the way the President had conducted himself at Reykjavik. In Seoul, I met with President Chun. He told me he strongly supported the way President Reagan had dealt with Gorbachev. In Beijing, there was a distinct shift away from their previous criticism of the positions the United States had taken at Reykjavik.

With the conclusion of Reykjavik “**non-summit,**” we had crossed a watershed. Reagan had extricated himself from the quagmire of eliminating all nuclear weapons and had narrowly avoided a disaster. We were pleased and somewhat surprised that Gorbachev did not return to the issue. Perhaps he would wait until he developed a greater skill in dealing with the Western press.

As for Reagan’s main objective of pursuing a broad agenda, the results were still meager. There was not much progress on regional and bilateral issues and human rights, but there had been a discussion of these issues. Still, there was some hope that arms control could be moved away from the center of our foreign policy.

Six years of firmness and patience were beginning to pay off. The Soviets had not only proposed the virtual elimination of intermediate-range forces, but indicated a willingness to reduce strategic offensive forces by 50 percent in a manner entirely acceptable to us. Only the Soviet artificial linkage of SDI to reductions stood in the way of agreement.

All in all, Reykjavik proved a success for President Reagan. He was on the right track in pursuing the objective.

Q: Can you tell me about the Washington summit?

A: The Washington summit of November 1987, the third summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, is, for the most part, remembered because the two leaders initialed the INF treaty. And it is right that it should be remembered, because the INF treaty marked a watershed in arms control. It eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles and specified that the missiles would be destroyed under the eyes of inspectors.

The final treaty, which had been “agreed in principle” at Reykjavik more than a year earlier was not achieved easily. The Soviets employed the same delaying tactics they had used earlier. They employed the eleventh-hour negotiating tactics of introducing a new item to split us from our allies. In short, they used every stratagem they had used in the past to make things difficult for us and to extract the maximum advantages for themselves.

Early in 1987, Secretary Schultz traveled to **Moscow** to try to get things moving. This meeting went nowhere because we discovered that our new embassy, which was nearing completion, had hundreds of bugging devices implanted into the building’s walls and beams. Soviet contractors erecting the building had not permitted us to inspect it as it was going up. Now, as the building was nearing completion some of the devices had not been completely covered up and were

discovered by our inspectors. I climbed into the attic with Secretary Schultz and saw hundreds of devices which had been blatantly placed in the building. To meet on classified matters we had to squeeze into aluminum house trailers we had shipped to Moscow. These trailers, placed in the basement of the new embassy, were shielded with antibugging material. To get classified messages to Washington we had to write them out in long hand, then have them taken by courier to Helsinki where they were typed and dispatched over secure circuits. Even our typewriters in Moscow were bugged.

In October we traveled to Moscow for one of our many sessions to try to advance START. As was our habit, we flew to Helsinki where we caught up on our jet lag and did our final internal coordination. This time a fog had settled over the area. To save a day we decided to take an overnight train to Moscow. Soviet officials said, "Sorry, no cars are available." Undaunted, we asked-and received-cars from the Finnish government. Not only were the cars nicer than Soviet cars, but we were provided with a diner as well. Even so, the Soviets insisted on a car for their "escorts" We surmised they wanted their KGB [Soviet Committee of State Security] agents along.

As I often did to pass the time away, I took out my harmonica and played American and Russian tunes. Our people joined in on the singing and had a good time. When we arrived in Moscow the next day, news stories accused: "Rowny, the right wing hawk, of playing 'prerevolutionary tunes.'" I did not realize that my repertoire included "prerevolutionary or that the older Russian tunes were frowned upon.

Later that day I ran into Gernadi Gerosimov, an acquaintance of some years who had been editor of *Pravda*. "Gorbachev has decided that it is more important to influence the American public than inform his own people." He said. "I'm now writing for Americans, and not for Soviets." Signs of changing times.



Ambassador Edward L. Rowny playing his famous harmonica, 30 January 1985.

Throughout the fall of 1987, we continued to grind away on the details of the INF treaty. The Soviets introduced new demands, such as insisting that the Pershing missiles we had built and stored in the U.S. for the Germans, be destroyed. We dug in our heels and reminded the Soviets that bilateral agreements with other nations would not be affected by U.S.-Soviet agreements.

Failing to split us from our allies, the Soviets tried to link progress in INF to concessions they wanted us to make on the ABM treaty, especially as it affected our SDI program.

In late October, just five weeks before the scheduled Washington summit, there were still 36 issues to be resolved. Unfortunately, we had reached an "agreement in principle" with the Soviets and had set a date for the signing of the treaty. As they had always done, the Soviets tried to exploit the situation and benefit by employing eleven-hour negotiating tactics. They even resorted to making new demands. Two weeks later, with three weeks left, there were 41 outstanding issues, the Soviets had added five more.

Our INF negotiator, Mike Glitman, was working night and day in Geneva to get the treaty ready. On their last Saturday in Geneva, the day before the team was scheduled to leave Geneva, there were still four unresolved issues. That morning, when Glitman went to the Soviet compound to try to resolve the remaining issues, he was told that Alexi Obukhov, his opposite number, was not available. A frustrated Glitman later learned that Obukhov had gone skiing. Not to be put off, Glitman went back to the Soviet compound Saturday evening. He was told that Obukhov was back, but was tired and would see Glitman Sunday morning.

On Sunday Glitman was able to hammer out three of the four remaining issues. The last holdout concerned a photo of the SS-20 missile the Soviets had promised us. Obukhov said there were no photos of the missile; that it was never displayed outside its canister. He produced a photo of the canister but Glitman said it would not do. The U.S. and Soviet teams nevertheless flew to Washington, the Soviets promising that when they arrived in Washington they would turn over a photo of the SS-20. When they arrived, the Soviets produced the same photo of the canister.

That night an emergency session of our team and policy makers debated what to do. The State Department considered it a trivial issue, one that should not hold up the signing ceremony scheduled to take place on Tuesday. The Defense Department thought otherwise—a promise was a promise. They argued that the Senate would not readily ratify a treaty if promises had been broken. Secretary Schultz decided to pass the issue up to Reagan for decision. Reagan made the decision readily. He said, "No tickie, no laundry; no photo, no treaty?"

On Tuesday morning Ambassador Dubinin arrived at the State Department with a photo of a SS-20. It was a poor image, obviously sent by fax to Washington overnight. The CIA looked it over and said that while it was a poor photo, it would do.

True to form, the Soviets tried one more delaying tactic at the eleventh hour. On Tuesday morning, just hours before the two o'clock signing ceremony, the Soviets reopened the question of German missiles in the United States. There was some thought of postponing the ceremony, but the President turned down that idea. We later learned that Nancy Reagan's astrologer had picked the time for the signing of the treaty.

At 11:10 a.m., Kampelman, Nitze and I joined the President and the "core group" in the cabinet room. Gorbachev did most of the talking. He was animated and spoke in rough and blunt terms. There was some question over whether Gorbachev's use of the word *boltat*, which he used to describe Reagan, was a slur. Reagan let it pass. Having seen Gorbachev's smile in public, we were now seeing his "iron teeth."

The President found it hard to get a word in edgewise. Feeling it was time for a story to break the ice, Reagan attempted to bring Gorbachev around by telling him the tale about two cab drivers. A Soviet cab driver immigrated to the United States and was asked what he would do. "I don't know," said the Soviet cabbie, "I haven't decided yet." An American cabbie emigrating to the Soviet Union was asked what he would do. "I don't know," said the American, "the Politburo has not yet decided." Gorbachev was not amused. It was **1:30**; the visitors and reporters were beginning to assemble in the Rose Garden.

At the last minute it was Frank Carlucci, the National Security Advisor, who came forward with a solution. He had talked to the Germans earlier. They agreed that if the Soviets made it a sticking point, rather than hold up the signing, the Germans would permit Soviet inspectors to visit the sites in the U.S. where the Germans' missiles were stored. Although we did not like to use this solution, feeling we should stand on principle, it proved a face-saving device for Gorbachev. The signing ceremony went ahead, only a few minutes late.

That evening, at the state dinner in the White House, one would never have guessed, watching an affable and smiling Gorbachev, that he had almost derailed the signing of the INF treaty. As he sang along in Russian to **Van** Clibum's playing of "Moscow Nights," I wondered what would have happened if Carlucci had not produced a solution at the last minute. Would Gorbachev have signed? I just didn't know. Teeth of iron? He certainly had intestines of steel.

Q: Can you tell me about the run-up to the fourth Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, the Moscow summit?

A: There were less than six months after the Washington summit left to prepare for the Moscow summit in mid-1988. It would be Reagan's fourth and last meeting with Gorbachev.

The time was spent on three tasks: first, getting INF ratified in the Senate; second, trying to complete an agreement on START; and third, advancing Reagan's broad agenda on human rights.

Despite the obvious advantages to the U.S. of the INF treaty, it did not enjoy smooth sailing during the Senate ratification process. There were two reasons. First, a coalition of senators led by **Biden** and Nunn used the ratification process of INF as a vehicle for advancing their view of the narrow versus broad interpretation of the ABM treaty. This was a red herring and only served to delay things. The second reason was that a group of other senators, led by Senator Quayle, wanted to eliminate-or at least tighten up-loopholes in the verification provisions of the INF treaty. They believed it important that INF not serve as a bad precedent for START.

Several senators and a few newspaper commentators were surprised by my strong support for INF during the Senate's deliberations of the treaty. They had branded me as an "inflexible hawk" because of my opposition to SALT II. They believed that I was against any agreement with the Soviets. Not so. I had always maintained that I favored agreements, but only if they were equal and verifiable. The INF treaty met these criteria, and accordingly, I enthusiastically endorsed it. There had been, of course, the usual Soviet attempts to exploit loopholes and capitalize upon certain of its aspects; but, by and large, the INF treaty was a good one. It eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles from Europe and from Asia as well; and it promised to do so in a verifiable manner which included on-site inspection.

At the time I began working for the INF treaty's ratification, there were more than 20, perhaps as many as 25, senators who expressed reservations about the treaty. President Reagan did not want to see that many votes registered against a treaty he too felt was a good one. The White House charged me with getting the negative vote down to 10.

I worked hard at this task. In some instances I was able to convince senators that such things as the lack of provisions for destroying warheads did not make for a bad treaty. In other instances I helped senators and their staffs draft proposals to the administration which they in turn negotiated with the Soviets in Geneva. These

helped close loopholes and strengthen the verification of the treaty. In the end, I surpassed the goal assigned me—only five senators voted against the treaty.

The second part of our preparation for the Moscow summit, advancing START, went less smoothly. Although we concluded that many of the remaining obstacles to START had been resolved at Reykjavik, the Soviets would not agree to the fine print. During the experts' meetings we held with the Soviets in the spring of 1988, two things became clear. First, that the Soviets wanted to link progress in START to an advancement of their own ideas in the defense arena. They wanted to preserve the ABM treaty and the narrow interpretation they gave it. They still wanted to kill our U.S. SDI programs.

The Soviets were in no hurry to conclude a START agreement and were determined to do so only on their terms. Informal discussions I had with Marshal Akhromeyev and General Chervov convinced me that the Soviets were intent on remaining a superpower. And to remain a superpower in the face of their declining economic power and their internal political difficulties convinced them that they should retain their nuclear strength. The Soviets were willing to reduce their conventional forces because the geographic location made them confident their security would not be endangered. Besides, they needed the resources to be saved by conventional force reductions. Since strategic forces cost only one-seventh as much as conventional forces, the Soviets decided they could afford the strategic expenditures.

Faced with evidence of Soviet intransigence on START, President Reagan told Lou Cannon, in an interview, not to expect a START agreement to come out of the Moscow summit.

Our third task during the run up to the Moscow summit was to advance President Reagan's broad agenda. In a series of ministerial meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Secretary Schultz hammered away at President Reagan's desire to get some agreement on human rights and regional issues. Constant pressure on the Soviets' performance in human rights was beginning to pay small but discernible dividends. However, there was little if any progress on regional affairs. The two ministers continued to talk past one another. Still, each side was able to explain its positions and elaborate on it; at the very least each side clearly understood where the other side stood.

In the preparations for the Moscow summit, I was once again struck by the important role speech writers played in gaining support for the President's policies. Some of the fiercest interagency battles were fought—usually behind the scenes—over what went into these speeches. Several days before we left for Moscow, a speech Reagan was to give in Helsinki came across my desk. I thought it was an

excellent speech. It was full of imagery and reinforced our basic values. I sent Tony Dolan an “attaboy” note congratulating him on the speech.

On the plane to Helsinki, Tony was crestfallen. “Look what they’ve done to the speech,” he said. The State Department edited out passages about the church bells which could still ring in Helsinki. Their reasoning was that it made odious comparisons between the Finns and Soviets over the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. That was, of course, what the speech was intended to do. Moreover, they struck out the word “totalitarian,” saying it put Gorbachev in the same class as Hitler. Although Dolan was familiar with Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s “authoritarian” vs “totalitarian” arguments, he felt he was using the right word. But Dolan had written the famous “evil empire” speech, and the State Department action officers knew they had him in a vulnerable position.

I decided to weigh in. Not able to get to see Secretary Schultz, I wrote him a note. I said he obviously hadn’t seen the original speech. If he had, I added, I thought he would have left it intact. To my pleasant surprise, either because of my intervention or for some other reasons, the President gave the speech as Dolan had drafted it. It was a great speech.

I was pleased to see James Billington on the plane ride to Helsinki. Billington, an eminent Russian scholar, had written *The Icon and the Axe* a seminal work which explained the czars’ dual use of religion and force. Reagan was availing himself of some of the best minds in the U.S. to help him use the best arguments-and the right words-in appealing to the basic cultural and historical wellsprings of the Russians.

When the summit opened, Reagan led off, as we expected, with human rights. Although Shevardnadze had been rather passive when Schultz raised human rights at their meetings, Gorbachev now took the offensive. When Reagan spoke about political prisoners, Gorbachev talked about the “inhumanity” of capital punishment. When Reagan spoke about the inability of Soviets freely to leave the Soviet Union, Gorbachev brought up the Mexicans’ inability to freely enter the United States. Gorbachev suggested that Reagan give him a catalog of “humanitarian problems” in the United States and he would in return provide a similar catalog to Reagan. They could then, he said, work together on the combined list. Reagan was for once speechless. He was outraged at this blatant attempt to establish moral equivalence.

Reagan shifted to regional matters. He brought up the entire range of issues, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Ethiopia, Angola, and Central America. Gorbachev’s response amounted to a great deal of circumlocution and double talk.

During some of the sessions which I attended, I noted a desire by Gorbachev to emulate Reagan's use of wit and humor to break the ice. He was not very good at telling stories-but at least he tried.

At one point Gorbachev told a self-deprecating story about *perestroika*. A man went into a bar and ordered a vodka. "That will be one ruble," the bartender said. "But it was only 50 kopeks yesterday.*" "One ruble," the bartender insisted. Given a ruble the bartender gave the customer 50 kopeks change. "We're out of vodka," he said, "that's perestroika at work.

Sensing that even though Reagan laughed, the joke had fallen flat, Gorbachev tried again.

A raven saw a fox running down a path in the forest. "Why not try perestroika?" the raven asked. "When I fly backwards, you should run backwards." The fox did so and ran into the open jaws of a wolf. As the fox was being devoured he complained to the raven. "Oh, I forgot to tell you," the raven said, "perestroika is for high flyers only." This time Gorbachev was pleased as Reagan laughed heartily.

Much has been written about Nancy Reagan's behavior toward Raisa, and in my opinion unfairly. Although I had heard that Mrs. Reagan didn't like me because I allegedly egged her husband on to expound conservative views, I must say that what I observed of her in Moscow was exemplary. I was present at the famous Moscow museum incident. Nancy Reagan had arrived at the appointed hour and was kept waiting for almost half an hour for Raisa Gorbachev to appear. When she did arrive, Raisa did so with a crowd of reporters who had been following her. After perfunctorily greeting Nancy, Raisa launched into a diatribe on the "obvious superiority" of Russian art over America's. Although Mrs. Reagan's knuckles went white, to her credit she restrained herself and did not answer Mrs. Gorbachev in kind. I was disappointed that the reporters-at least the American ones-did not praise Nancy Reagan for the restraint she showed under such difficult and provocative circumstances.

President Reagan gave a memorable speech during the Moscow summit at the Moscow university. It was a tour de force. A thousand students, undoubtedly hand-picked by Soviet authorities, were assembled to hear the President. They were prepared to be polite, but also prepared not to be persuaded. Reagan cut his 40 minute speech to 20 minutes, giving only the topic sentences and conclusion of his prepared speech. It was a soft but polished sales pitch on the virtues of the capitalist system. Reagan's simple eloquence, his sincerity, and his conviction got through to the audience.

But it was during the question and answer period, which lasted an hour, that Reagan won them over. The students were taking part in something they had obviously never experienced before. Here was the head of a superpower, the most powerful nation on earth and one they had been taught was their enemy, answering questions candidly, clearly, and logically. In an hour's time Reagan gave them a basic course in civics, the likes of which they had never heard before and would not soon forget. I must confess that I was transfixed by the way Reagan simply and convincingly answered their toughest questions. When he finished they gave him a standing ovation. He had even gotten to me, even though I had heard much of this before. I applauded too, unabashedly proud of our President.

On the previous evening, I had been at the state dinner hosted by the Gorbachevs. It was standard fare--a heavy meal, boring dinner conversation, and long toasts.

The Reagans' return dinner was different; a replica of the "beautiful people" state dinners which had become the Reagans' trademark. When the guests began to arrive, I was amazed at who had been invited: Soviet ballet stars, athletes, priests, rabbis, and dissidents. Raisa Gorbachev appeared startled also, at times seeming to hold back rather than shake hands with the guests, most of whom she had never met and didn't want to meet.

At my table Gromyko sat on my right and Sakharov on my left. Other seats were filled by a ballerina, a wrestler, and a priest. I sat next to the famous Soviet mass production cataract surgeon. He said he would operate on me and charge nothing. I declined.

Our meal included New England clam chowder, grilled Kansas City steaks, green asparagus and Idaho baked potatoes. All of this was accompanied by delicious California wines. For dessert we had deep-dish apple pie and ice cream.

After dinner there were no speeches. Reagan simply delivered a short toast and before Gorbachev could respond the music struck up at Reagan's signal. He asked Raisa to dance. An embarrassed Gorbachev shuffled around the floor with Nancy. The Gorbachevs had been to a dinner like this in Washington, but I'm certain never expected to attend one like it in Moscow. Unlike the 10 p.m. curfew at Soviet dinners, the guests stayed long after the Gorbachevs' and Reagans' departure.

We had one more half-day's work in **Moscow**. This was reserved for beating out the final communique. It contained nice words, of course, about the ratification of the INF treaty. But then there was a great deal of sparring to see which side could get in its own wording to influence the outcome of START. For the most part, this portion of the communique was devoted to papering over the differences;

neither side wanted to be blamed for the lack of progress on START. But the most difficult part had to do with the words “peaceful coexistence” which Gorbachev wanted in the communique. He wanted to be able to tell the important CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] conference that the Soviet Union had not only achieved superpower status but that the U.S. had adopted the Soviet approach to foreign policy.

The problem was compounded because Reagan, in an earlier meeting with Gorbachev, said he agreed that “**peaceful** coexistence* was important. Gorbachev accordingly insisted that the words be included in the communique, stating that Reagan had agreed. However, a startled set of U.S. advisors told Reagan he couldn’t agree to such wording. Reagan was uncomfortable, but did not want to disagree with his staff. The impasse went right down to the wire. The final ceremony at which the instruments of the INF ratification were to be exchanged was delayed 30 minutes. Gorbachev was adamant that “peaceful coexistence” be included; and Reagan, flanked by his advisors, was determined that it not appear. In the end, Reagan won out. An angry Gorbachev, red-faced and muttering to himself, initialed the communique.

Reagan’s final summit meeting with Gorbachev was a success. He had succeeded in getting the Soviets to agree to, and the Senate to ratify, the INF treaty. And Gorbachev finally admitted that the Soviets would get out of Afghanistan. But the greatest achievement was Reagan’s success at getting the Soviets to address his broad agenda of human rights and foreign policy issues. Reagan had kept his eye on the objective which was now being accomplished. It was a fitting legacy to leave to his successor.

Q: We finished then with the fourth and last of the summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev in May of 1988, almost in time for the elections to come about. Were you involved in those elections?

A: Yes, I checked and found out that the terms of my appointment did not put me under the Hatch Act. Accordingly, I campaigned for candidate, then Vice President, Bush. I made my usual rounds of talking to audiences that were interested in arms control. I also spoke to audiences which had an interest in defense. I spoke, for example, to the National War College graduates because I was then the president of their alumni association. I also talked to ethnic groups, primarily to Poles but also to Hungarians and Czechs. In other words, I campaigned on several levels simultaneously. I also wrote several op-ed pieces in favor of Bush, saying that his views on foreign policy were diametrically opposed to those of Governor Dukakis. I was delighted that Bush won by a handsome margin.

As is customary after an election, I submitted my resignation. But I was told that President-elect Bush wanted me to stay on until further notice. Accordingly, I continued to operate in the same capacity as formerly as special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for arms control matters.

It was heartwarming to me that two days before he left office, President Reagan presented me with the Citizen's Medal of Freedom.



President Reagan and Ambassador Rowny at the Reagan ranch in California, February 1990.

Q: Regarding the groups that you talked to during the period of time of Bush's election campaign, were they pro-Bush or were they people that you were trying to convince to keep the Reagan-Bush stand on arms control?

A: The people I talked to were generally well disposed toward the Reagan-Bush philosophy. I was, for the most part, trying to convince them that it was important to get out and vote, and vote the right way. The groups I talked to were not hostile audiences and generally the questions were benign. I was trying to ensure that people who felt disposed toward Reagan would in fact vote for Bush. It was more an insurance policy of holding onto our friends than trying to convert our enemies.

Q: I gather you felt that your speeches were rather well received?

A: Yes. I felt I helped bring along the people who were pro-defense and interested in arms control. Eight years earlier a large number of people were skeptical over whether Reagan was or was not in favor of arms control. They now saw the evidence; he brought home a very satisfactory INF treaty. One of the questions I was asked quite often was whether I, in fact, favored the INF treaty. I said I did mainly because it eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and had good verification provisions. I thought good verification provisions would stand us in good stead for later treaties like a strategic arms treaty [START].

I was quick to point out that signing the INF treaty did not mean that peace was about to break out all over. I emphasized that I continued to favor a START treaty, provided it would be equitable and effectively verifiable.

Q: After President Bush was elected, what did you learn about your permanent status?

A: I heard sometime in April that Paul Nitze, who had also been asked to stay on until further notice, was asked by Secretary Baker to become an “advisor emeritus?”

Nitze would not remain in government, but would be called upon from time to time to give advice. He turned this down and submitted his resignation. I wondered what they had in store for me. Several weeks later I got a call asking if I would stay on indefinitely in my current position. I talked this offer over with several White House officials. I also spoke to Larry Eagleburger, Baker’s deputy, and with Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security advisor. I learned that President Bush and Secretary Baker wanted me to stay on. I didn’t answer them right away because I had lined up a job to teach at George Washington University. I was reluctant to stay on because President Bush let it be known that he would deal with an overall set of advisors, and that my views would be transmitted to him not personally, but in writing. But I decided I would have a role to play, although limited, in giving the negotiations some continuity. I knew the issues, knew the Soviets, and knew the players on our side. Since I thought I could make a contribution, I decided to stay on.

Because of the long clearance process, it was not until Friday, June 16, 1989, that the White House made its official announcement that the President had appointed me to remain as special advisor to the Secretary of States and the President for arms control matters.

In the meantime, I had attended the first substantive meeting that Secretary Baker had with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. Following that meeting I traveled once again to debrief our Asian allies and friends on the talks. Actually, I was the last U.S. official in Beijing at the time the students were demonstrating. I left China the day that Gorbachev arrived for his official visit. Several days later the shooting occurred in Tianinen Square.

In early June, after the NATO summit, President Bush sent me to Mexico and Brazil to debrief officials there. I had an hour-long meeting with the President of Mexico and another hour with his foreign minister. I also met with congressional groups and people from other walks of life. I repeated the same pattern in Brazil. On this first trip to Brazil I didn’t see the president-the highest man I saw there was the foreign minister. As in Mexico they were grateful to learn about what



President George Bush and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, 13 November 1989.

happened at the summit. I made similar visits later, extending them to Argentina and Chile.

Q: The next landmark was the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta, December **1989**. Can you tell me something about the preliminaries leading up to Malta and about the meeting itself?

A: President Bush, after he was elected, started out carefully and deliberately in arms control. He said he wanted his to be a Bush I and not a Reagan III administration. He would wait until his administration sorted out its policies before proceeding further on arms control.

Q: What kinds of things needed sorting out?

A: The Bush administration was not certain where it wanted to go with a number of its strategic programs. The biggest unanswered question was what to do about land-based mobile systems. The Soviets had developed a rail-mobile system, the SS-24s, about the size of our **M-X** which also carried 10 warheads on each missile. The Soviets had several dozen SS-24s deployed, some on rail cars and some in fixed silos. The Soviets had also developed and deployed several hundred SS-25s. These were single warhead road mobile systems. The United States, on the other hand, was still trying to decide how to deploy its M-X missile; whether to place it on rail cars or deploy it in fixed silos. Secretary of Defense Cheney favored the M-X on rail cars. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, however, favored developing and deploying the Midgetman, our version of the Soviet's single warhead road mobile system.

The Congress was also split. Some legislators favored a rail-mobile M-X; others preferred the rail-mobile Midgetman. President Bush, always the great compromiser and wishing to be "prudent," asked the Congress for funds to develop both systems.

Another undecided question was the extent to which the U.S. should produce B-2 bombers. The B-2 was becoming more and more expensive. President Bush asked the Congress for money for the 132 B-2s the Air Force said it required to cover our SIOP [strategic integrated operational plan] targets. Congressional leaders said they would back no more than 50. The difficulty with this was that 132 B-2s was the number needed by the Air Force to cover the targets after we reduced the specified number of missiles under the impending START agreement.

Thus, the United States was faced with a split within the administration and also a split between the administration and the Congress.

About this time there was a week-long visit to the United States by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, had invited Akhromeyev to the United States for a series of briefings and conversations. He also offered him visits to Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps installations. I did not tour the states with Akhromeyev but talked to the marshal before he left the United States. On his last day, shortly before he left, I had an hour-long private conversation with Akhromeyev.

Akhromeyev was highly impressed by what he saw at our Army training camps, and especially by the razzle-dazzle of our special forces. He was also quite impressed by the sophistication of our tanks and other equipment, and by the caliber, state of training, and morale of our soldiers. He was given a ride in a B-2 and flew by computer at high speeds at 300 feet.

During his visits to Air Force installations, he was struck by the number of women the U.S. had in its armed services. The Soviet Union had less than **1/2 of 1** percent females whereas the U.S. had about 10 percent. On one occasion he went down the line of an Air Force crew, starting with the most junior member. When he got to the next to the last in line, he asked him what his job was. "I'm the deputy crew chief," he said.

"And who do you work for?" asked the marshal.

"For her, the crew chief," he said.

An astonished Akhromeyev gallantly kissed the fingertips of the female crew chief.

But Akhromeyev was most impressed by our Navy. He was taken aboard an aircraft carrier and astonished to see planes taking off and landing at night. He was shown two Navy fighters taking off simultaneously, at night, from a carrier. He told me he had witnessed "the impossible."

Akhromeyev told me that the Soviet army was badly in need of sophisticated equipment; it could not begin to match that of the United States. He also said he was impressed by our noncommissioned officers. Enlisted men were commanded by officers in the Soviet Union with no in-between set of experienced, career enlisted men. He said that one of the reforms he would undertake was the development of a noncommissioned officer corps. He said he was impressed by the honesty and frankness of the soldiers he met. "They think for themselves and are not taught by rote like our brainwashed soldiers. They will undoubtedly show initiative on the battlefield," he added, "something we can't even count on our officers to do."

Akhromeyev told me he was a true believer in the Communist system. "But the system will need to reform, he said, "so the economy can afford a first-class military establishment. One of the ways to save money," he added, "is to reduce our oversized conventional forces. " He said he was a believer in conventional arms control, but said that the U.S. should expect only token reductions in the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

"The Soviet Union wants to be perceived as a superpower," Akhromeyev said, "and the only way to be acknowledged as having that status is to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The Soviets understand that the U.S. public wants arms agreements across-the-board," he added, "and, therefore, the USSR will press for naval arms control; since we are a land power, we would benefit from such agreements." He said that the Soviets recognize that strategic defenses are necessary and inevitable. The Soviet Union will continue to develop and deploy

strategic defenses but will exploit our ambivalence by fanning anti-SDI sentiment in the United States.

My net impression of Akhromeyev was that he was a professional military man who would strive to reform the Soviet armed forces. But at the same time, he was a true believer in Communism who believed, like his patron Gorbachev, that the system could, in time, be reformed.

Q: To get back to the pre-Malta preparations, I understand that Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Wyoming in the fall of 1989. Can you tell me something about that meeting?

A: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev apparently decided that it would be a good idea if their foreign ministers had preliminary discussions prior to the principal getting together. Accordingly, Baker invited Shevardnadze to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. He thought that in such relaxed surroundings, away from their respective capitals, they could have more extensive and more leisurely talks.

The weather cooperated, and in the late Indian summer, many of the meetings were conducted out of doors. The Soviets were able to ride horseback, fish, and hike on the trails of the great Western countryside. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves. One of the Soviet experts commented on what a great country America was. "Here in your Siberia," he said, "one can go to a supermarket and buy fresh meat and vegetables and even frozen fish."

Another one of their experts wanted to take home some souvenirs. Approaching a saleslady, he said, "Do you speak any Russian?" "No," she said. "I know only one word: *vodka*." "Don't you know what perestroika is?" he asked. "No," she said, "I'm a teetotaler."

The meetings on arms control, while not overly productive, were nevertheless reported in an upbeat tone. Shevardnadze dropped his insistence that there be a separate treaty on defense and space, which he had previously linked to a START treaty. However, he built in one of the Soviets' typical loopholes. Linkage would be dropped, he said, if "both sides would continue to comply with the ABM treaty as signed in 1972." The Soviets, in other words, were harking back to their insistence on the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty. It was their way of putting us on notice that they had no intention of abandoning their policy of stifling the United States strategic defense developments.

Shevardnadze also said that the Soviets were willing to conclude an agreement on sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCMs] separate from the actual START treaty.

Here again, however, there was a catch. Shevardnadze said SLCMs could be dealt with in the same manner that the Backfire bomber had been handled in SALT II. He should have realized that this was a nonstarter; the U.S. had no intention of getting sucked into another “backfire solution” in which the Soviets simply excluded a class of international strategic systems from the SALT II treaty.

Despite these paltry moves, laden with conditions favorable to the Soviets, Baker praised what he called “positive developments. It was the standard language diplomats use when they want to put a good face on a poor state of affairs. Their hope is that progress will be made if they describe negotiations in a favorable light. Baker even went further. He said, “We have, in my view, moved from confrontation to dialogue and now to cooperation.”

Shevardnadze, not to be outdone, responded: “I will say without any exaggeration, these talks have placed Soviet-American dialogue at a new stage.” Their disclaimers notwithstanding, both Baker and Shevardnadze had indulged in serious exaggerations.

Baker threw a lavish barbecue party at the conclusion of the talks, at which each of the Soviets was given a red bandanna and a Texas-style hat. Baker did even better by Shevardnadze, presenting him with a custom-made pair of cowboy boots. Shevardnadze, impressed that Baker had gone to the trouble to learn his measurements, reciprocated with a highly unusual gift. He gave Baker an antique icon, saying that he knew Baker was deeply religious. It was an ironic situation; the avowed atheist Shevardnadze gave Christian Baker a gift with religious overtones. An embarrassed Baker sheepishly accepted the gift.

Q: Why was Malta picked as the meeting place for the summit?

A: When I heard where the meeting was to take place, I raised an objection because of the connotation that a meeting in the seaport of Malta would involve naval arms control. But it was too late; preparations were already in motion. The location had been suggested to the President by his younger brother, an international businessman who thought the island provided a “charming setting” for a summit.

President Bush’s idea of meeting in **Malta** was similar to President Reagan’s idea of meeting at Reykjavik. The two leaders would meet at some out-of-the-way place where hotel space and communications facilities were limited, thus theoretically reducing the amount of attention the world media would devote to the meeting. But just as it had in Reykjavik, the plan boomeranged; reporters and TV commentators turned out in full force.

The meeting, Bush said, would be devoted to general discussions and no specific arms control matters would be taken up. Because of the general nature of the discussions and the limited facilities at Malta, it was decided that no arms control experts would travel with the President. Rather, we were to stand by our telephones to answer questions that might come up.

It was just as well that we didn't travel to Malta. A severe storm blew up which disrupted the meetings. Malta suffered a storm, the likes of which had not been seen in the Mediterranean in a decade. The high seas and 60-mile per hour winds kept Bush from leaving the cruiser *Belnap* for his scheduled meeting with Gorbachev on the Soviet warship *Slava*. On the second day, an impatient Bush took off for a meeting with Gorbachev on the Soviet pleasure boat *Maxim Gorky*. By deciding to brave the elements, Bush's critics said he was trying to live down his "wimp image." The admiral's barge in which he made the trip was described as bouncing around like a cork in a bathtub. After five attempts to board the *Maxim Gorky* in the high seas and howling wind, Bush made it on the sixth try. He could have saved himself the trouble; Gorbachev did not risk leaving the *Slava*.

When the two leaders finally got together, Bush immediately moved to bolster Gorbachev's position in the Soviet Union and internationally. Making certain that the reporters were within earshot, Bush told Gorbachev, "You are dealing with an administration that wants to see the success of what you are doing. ... The world would be a better place if perestroika succeeds."

I was surprised that Gorbachev did not reply personally. His spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, said that the talks were "excellent" and that "the Cold War is over." This was the first official statement on either side announcing the end of the Cold War. However, to Bush's advisors, such a statement appeared premature and overly optimistic. Alarmed that the rhetoric overstated the case, Bush's aides acted quickly to dampen the euphoria. America's offers to help perestroika would evaporate, they said, if the Soviets did not clean up their act in Central America.

Q: Was arms control discussed at Malta?

A: Yes. Despite Bush's intention to stay away from substantive discussions on arms control, Gorbachev brought up START and CFE. The desultory discussions in an acknowledgement from both leaders that START had a number of issues yet to be resolved and that little progress had been made. As for CFE, Bush accepted Gorbachev's suggestion that a 23-nation conference be scheduled in Berlin to clear up the remaining obstacles.

Toward the end of the Malta meeting, Baker and Shevardnadze worked for three hours trying to hammer out a joint communique on START that would show that some progress had been made. But they got nowhere because, in fact, there had been no progress.

In an otherwise gloomy atmosphere, there was one glimmer of hope. Some movement had taken place on one of President Bush's pet issues: chemical weapons. The two leaders pledged to end all production and to destroy almost all existing stocks of chemical weapons within ten years. As insurance, Bush insisted that the U.S. keep 500 tons of chemical weapons until all other countries capable of producing such munitions signed an agreement banning them. This idea of maintaining a stockpile did not sit well with critics, both abroad and at home. Later, in May 1991, President Bush succumbed to media pressure and dropped his insistence that the U.S. keep a stock of chemical munitions. In its place, he adopted a policy that had a good ring to it as a public relations ploy but was still quite safe. The United States would destroy all chemical stocks if the other chemical-producing nations signed a verifiable treaty banning chemical weapons.

It was a safe proposal because no one would hold his breath until a treaty with verifiable provisions could be worked out.

The two leaders did agree at Malta that Baker and Shevardnadze would meet in January 1990 to tackle the three largest stumbling blocks in START: air-launched cruise missile [ALCM] ranges and counting rules; non-deployed missiles; and telemetry encryption.

When President Bush returned from Malta, I found that he had a new assignment for me. This time, in addition to debriefing the three Asian countries—that is, Japan, Korea and Australia (I did not go to China because Tiananmen Square was still fresh in our minds)—the President sent me to Mexico and Brazil. His thought was that the Latin America leaders felt that too much attention was being put on European affairs and not enough on affairs in our own hemisphere.

My visits to Mexico and Brazil proved very profitable. I was especially impressed by the youth and vigor of President Salinas of Mexico. In our preliminary conversation, I told Salinas I had heard a rumor that his three young children were attending Japanese schools in Mexico City. Salinas said it wasn't a rumor, that the story was correct. When I asked him why he would send his children to a Japanese school, his answer was, "Where else will they learn a good work ethic except in a Japanese school?" To me it was a clear indication of Salinas' attitude toward hard work and his determination to turn around the Mexican economy.

In Brazil I was received by the caretaker government. The president of Brazil had died after he was elected and before he was to have taken office, and an unpopular leader took over the government. Nevertheless, the Brazilian officials were cordial and quite flattered that President Bush would send a personal envoy to meet with them.

After the Malta meeting, it was obvious that Gorbachev and Bush were both anxious to move ahead on CFE and START. As planned, Baker and Shevardnadze met in Geneva in January 1990. However, no progress was made on arms control. President Bush, observing the collapse of communism in Europe, made the mistake of thinking that Gorbachev would rush to conclude a strategic arms agreement. He made the further mistake of announcing that START would be initialed at a June summit in 1990. He did not listen to the advice of those of us who had been through the experience of SALT II. In the past, external events had put no pressure on the Soviets to move towards arms agreements. There was little evidence that the Soviets would change their habits. As in the past, setting a deadline would only put U.S. negotiators under pressure to make concessions in order to meet a deadline.

Despite my misgivings, the Washington summit was held from May 30 to June 3, 1990. As I had predicted in January, the meetings yielded no breakthroughs on arms control. Determined to make it a significant public relations event, Bush pulled a surprise by bringing up the issue of trade. The President, anxious to bolster Gorbachev, gave him a concrete bonus to take home to the Soviet Union, which was hemorrhaging economically. Bush modified his stand that he would not sign a trade agreement until Gorbachev made concessions on other issues. Before the summit, Bush had wisely announced that there would be no trade agreement until the Soviet Union passed legislation codifying the right of the Soviet peoples to emigrate freely and until there was a let-up of pressure on the Baltic states seeking independence. Now, in his desire to prop up Gorbachev, the President was retreating from his earlier conditions.

Gorbachev was grateful for Bush's help with his domestic problems. But this did not cause him to be more forthcoming on arms control. The usual situation was now reversed. Instead of the Soviets raising arms control, it was now the United States that tried to get the Soviets to discuss it. Hoping to make some progress, Bush attempted to engage Gorbachev in informal discussions on arms control.

Either because Gorbachev felt he stood to lose out in such encounters at this time, or perhaps because his advisors were nervous about letting him act on his own, Gorbachev shunned Bush's invitation for informal get-togethers. Gorbachev flatly refused to go to Kennebunkport, Bush's Maine vacation home. Bush then tried to get Gorbachev to spend several days with him at Camp David. Gorbachev would

agree to only a ten-hour session, insisting that he had to get back to the Soviet Embassy in Washington to attend to “other business.” It was not clear what “other business” was more important than meeting with Bush. It may have been that Gorbachev was at that time having difficulty with the politburo and army officials. But for whatever reason, Gorbachev was now playing hard to get when it came to one-on-one informal sessions.

Retirement

Q: Didn't you decide to retire in June 1990 after the Washington summit?

A: Yes. After the Washington summit, I felt that my usefulness to the President as an arms control advisor was coming to an end. There had been no clear-cut differences between the President and myself on major issues, yet the general trend of events was not to my liking. The way in which I was required to give my advice was tolerable, but only barely so. I felt that I was no longer a major player on the President's team and that my views were not being taken sufficiently into account. I went to see John Sununu, the President's chief of staff, and asked his advice. He told me he was not surprised at how I felt, adding that he marvelled I had continued to function under such difficult conditions for so long. He said that Secretary Baker was Bush's principal, and at times only, advisor on arms control and that Baker overshadowed the other three principal advisors: National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Colin Powell. When I asked Sununu if there was some way I could improve my situation, he said he thought not.

I said that under the circumstances I would submit my resignation, effective June 30, 1990. I told Sununu that I would not make a big issue of my resignation, or take it to the press. He said he thought this was best; if I were to indicate that I was resigning in protest over the way I was being treated, the administration would simply paper things over. But in the long-run, he said, nothing would change. On my last day in office, Marlin Fitzwater made a simple announcement that I had resigned. The reporters asked him several questions, but he referred them to me. I was asked if I was resigning in protest or because of major policy differences with the Bush administration. Since I agreed with Sununu that airing my unhappiness about how I was being used would serve no useful purpose, I said only that I thought it was time for me to leave. President Bush's action was predictable. He sent me a nice letter, thanking me for "the contribution I had made to U.S. arms control policies."

Q: What happened to START after you resigned?